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NOTES
YEO V LEXINGTON: ABRIDGING RIGHTS
OF PUBLICATION IN THE STUDENT
PRESS
INTRODUCTION
Like many parents of high school-aged students enrolled in the
public schools of Lexington, Massachusetts, Douglas E. Yeo objected
when the town voted to adopt a condom distribution policy in Lex-
ington High School ("LHS" ). 1 He responded by forming a political
action group to oppose the policy arid submitting pro-abstinence ad-
vertisements for publication in the official LHS yearbook ("the year-
book") and newspaper ("the Musket"). 2 When student editors of both
publications declined to run Yeo's advertisements, citing unwritten
policies prohibiting the acceptance of political advertisements, Yeo
claimed that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been
violated and threatened to sues Upon the editors' issuance of their
final refusal to publish, Yco brought an action against his town and his
son's high school principal in federal district court.'
Both the local press and the district court decision that granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment portrayed plaintiff Yeo
as overly litigious and moralistic. 5 As Federal District Court Judge
Richard Stearns noted in his opinion, "fa) t. the end of the day, one
wonders whether this litigation was necessary." 6 Several editorials pub-
See Yco v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 244 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 2060
(1998).
2 See id. at 244, 245.
See id. at 245, 246, 248.
See id. at 248.
See Rochelle C. Cohen, Students Fight on for Press Freedoms, Bos.rox HERALD, Dec. 17, 1997,
at 35. The editorial staled in part, "Memo to Douglas Yea: Next time you want to get your
abstinence message over to teenagers, rent a billboard 	 But for heaven's sake don't make a
federal case out of it
	
. This was a piddling little squabble that escalated into a federal court
case because that's how things arc these days." Id.
Yea v. Town of Lexingtcm, No. 94-10811•RGS, at 18 (D. Mass. Apr. 22, 1996),
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lished in the Herald characterized this litigation as "a piddling little
squabble" and plaintiff Yeo himself as "spoiling for a fight." 7 In fact,
good reasons existed for wondering whether this litigation was neces-
sary. Yeo did not have to bring a legal action to communicate his
pro-abstinence message to the LHS community. LHS student editors
offered to, publish his message if he would either amend the content
of his advertisement or write a letter to the editor of the newspaper,
where editors felt his political message would be more appropriate. 8
This litigation seems unnecessary for another reason as well—the
media in question are the high school newspaper and yearbook. It
seems inherently wrong for an outsider to dictate the content of such
periodicals over the objections of the school administration, faculty
and student editors. But in the four opinions spawned by this litigation,
only First Circuit Justice Sandra Lynch (in dissent) addressed this issue
head-on: "It is passingly strange to even think of a student newspaper
as a public forum."° Further, she alone observed that the educational
process may be least disrupted by permitting the student editors'
decision to stand.'° In its en banc decision, the First Circuit almost
completely failed to address the special considerations attendant to
litigation arising in the context of public high schools."
Yeo's suit alleged that the publications' refusal to print his adver-
tisements constituted a violation of his rights to free speech and equal
protection under the Constitution." This litigation therefore broached
two important issues and complex constitutional doctrines. The court
first addressed whether the decisions of the student editors constituted
an action of the state, because the court cannot impose obligations
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution on
private actors without a finding of state action." Second, the court
grappled over whether student publications constitute public fora—
that is, government-owned areas such as streets or public parks in
7 Cohen, supra note 5, at 35.
8 See Yea, 131 F.3d at 246.
8
 Yen v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173, at *34 (1st Cir. 1997) (Lynch, J.,
dissenting).
18 See id. at *35. "There is a legitimate interest in preventing disruption of the educational
process. The school and its students have an interest in maintaining some form of harmony in
its student publications; avoiding use of its advertising pages to convey political or advocacy
Inessages may serve this end. The school and its students also have an interest in fostering
independent thought in student editors and may choose to do so by respecting those students'
independent conclusions." Id.
" See generally Yea, 131 F.3d at 241, 250.
12 See id. at 248.
IS See infra text accompanying notes 124-86.
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which members of the public traditionally have a right to express their
opinions without government restrictions."
This Note argues that although the First Circuit's en banc decision
was correctly decided, its reasoning is flawed because it failed to ad-
dress the special considerations of controversies arising in the context
of a public high school.' 5 The analyses of whether the student editors'
refusal to publish Yco's advertisement constitutes state action, and
whether student publications qualify as public forums, cannot be
meaningfully discussed without considering the role of educators in
controlling the content of student speech in classroom or school ac-
tivities. Part I of this Note examines important precedent on the state
action and public forum doctrines. 16 Part 11 analyzes the Yeo case,
including the recent en banc decision of the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit applying the state action doctrine to the editorial decisions
of student editors.° Part. III situates the doctrines of state action and
public forum in the context of current pedagogical theory, as devel-
oped by legal scholars and applied in Supreme Court opinions.' 8
Part IV of this Note examines the First Circuit's en banc decision
in light of the pedagogical theory currently favored by the United
States Supreme Court. In this Part, the Note argues first that the
decisions made by student editors of school-sponsored publications
can always be attributed to the state, because the role of educators in
formulating content is substantial whether or not they actively partici-
pate in the decision giving rise to litigation.' 9 Second, this Note argues
in this Part that the LHS yearbook and Musket do not qualify as
traditional public fora. 2° Rather, they are limited public fora that are
appropriately used to communicate only specific kinds of informa-
tion—specifically, the information which is consistent with the peda-
gogical philosophy of the school. 2 ' Therefore, LHS student editors may
constitutionally refuse to publish Yco's advertisement if they reasonably
believe that it does not represent values consistent with the school's
educational mission. 22
14 See id.
15 See, e.g., lianiwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhltncier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No, 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
141 See infra text accompanying notes 23-123.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 124-86.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 187-241.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 242-90.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 291-307.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 291-307.
22 See infra text accompanying notes 291-307.
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1. BACKGROUND
The First Amendment provides that Congress may not restrict an
individual's freedom of expression. 23 This protection has been ex-
tended to preclude all branches and agencies of the state from infring-
ing upon the First Amendment rights of a private citizen.24 The First
Amendment only protects freedom of speech against actions of the
government; therefore, a citizen must first demonstrate that the al-
leged violation occurred at the hands of the state. 25 If a plaintiff can
establish this notion of "state action" regarding a First Amendment
cause of action, the judiciary applies a public forum analysis to deter-
mine whether the state actor violated the citizen's right to freedom of
expression.26 The public forum doctrine requires the court to deter-
mine (1) the nature of the forum at issue and (2) whether the state's
regulation of a citizen's access to the forum represents a violation of
that citizen's First Amendment rights."
A. State Action Doctrine
Almost all of the individual rights afforded by the United States
Constitution, including the entire Bill of Rights, are judicially enforce-
able only against state or federal government action. 26 The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that purely private action is not
subject to the requirements of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 29
To state a claim alleging an abridgment of one's freedom of expres-
sion, therefore, a plaintiff must show that an arm of the federal or state
28 See U.S. CoNs.r. amend. I. The First Amendment states, in pertinent part, "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Id.
24 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) ("It is, of course a commonplace that the
constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government,
federal or state. Thus, while statutory or common law may in some situations extend protection
or provide redress against a private corporation or person who seeks to abridge the free expres-
sion of others, no such protection or redress is provided by the Constitution itself.").
28 See infra notes 33-60.
29 See generally Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985);
Perry Educ. Ass'i ► v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
27 See generally Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 788; Perry, 460 U.S. at 37.
28 See LAURENCE II. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrrurioNAL LAw § 18-1 (2nd ed. 1988). The
purpose of the state action doctrine is to limit the government's realm of action, thus protecting
the freedom of association of private individuals.
29 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) ("Private conduct
abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause unless to some
significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been found to have been involved in
it.") The principle of state action was first articulated iti the Civil Rights Cases. See 109 U.S, 3
(1883).
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government was responsible for the violation." The state's participa-
tion in an act that leads to a potential Constitutional violation is
sometimes immediately obvious, as with a state or federal statute that
restricts speech rights. The judiciary has also been asked to decide,
however, whether state action exists where a plaintiff alleges that a
government actor has supported or tacitly approved of the actions of
a private party through inaction, acquiescence or tolerance that con-
stitutes ratification of that private choices' When called upon to deter-
mine the existence of state action, the judiciary considers factors such
as state funding, state regulation, whether the actor performed a "state
function," whether the action was taken "under color of state law" and
whether a "symbiotic relationship" existed between the actor and the
state."
1. Supreme Court Decisions Establishing the "State Action" Doctrine
In 1961, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the United
States Supreme Court established the proposition that a government
can be implicated in the actions of a private citizen if there exists a
"symbiotic" relationship—one that is mutually beneficial—between the
state and the private actor." In Burton, the Wilmington Parking
Authority ("Authority"), a Delaware State agency, erected a parking
facility in downtown Wilmington. 34 The facility included several com-
mercial units that it leased to private businesses including a restau-
rant. 35 The plaintiff in Burton alleged that the restaurant violated his
rights under the Equal Protection Clause after it refused to serve him
on account of his race."
In assessing whether the government's participation in the restau-
rant's refusal of service rose to the level of state action, the Court
described the relationship between the garage and the restaurant as
"symbiotic" because each conferred a variety of mutual benefits upon
the other." The Court observed that guests of the restaurant have
access to a convenient parking place subsidized by the state govern-
ment, while the presence of the restaurant would likely attract addi-
" See Burton, 365 U.S. at 722.
51 See infra notes 33-60.
52 See infra notes 33-60.
" See 365 U.S. at 725.
54 See id. at 718.
"See id. at 719.
36
 See id. at 720.
57 See id. at 724.
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aortal revenue for the parking garage. 38 Indeed, the Authority would
have been unable to finance the garage but for the revenue from leases
of commercial establishments such as the restaurant. 39 Because the
state and the private enterprise conferred mutual benefits upon one
another, the Court found that the state was implicated in the discrimi-
natory actions of the private party."
In 1982, in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, the Court articulated four dif-
ferent tests to determine whether the actions of a private actor consti-
tute state action." The main issue in Rendell-Baker was whether a pri-
vate, publicly-funded school acted under color of state law when it
discharged petitioner employees who publicly opposed management
decisions, allegedly in violation of their rights under the First, Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments." The school, a private institution, re-
ceived the majority of its students through referrals from state agen-
cies, and thereby received public funds comprising at least ninety
percent of its annual operating budget." To receive tuition funding
from the state, the school was required to comply with extensive state
regulations.'"
The Court evaluated four factors which the petitioners alleged
made the school's discharge decisions fairly attributable to the state."
First, although the school received virtually all of its funds from the
state, the Court reasoned that financial support alone does not ele-
vate a private institution's personnel decisions to state action: 16 Second,
the Court evaluated whether the state could be implicated in the
school's employment decisions because it required the school to con-
form to certain regulations." Although these regulations were "exten-
sive," the Court reasoned that they neither compelled nor influenced
the school's personnel decisions in any way.48 Therefore, the state
regulations lacked a sufficiently close nexus to the school's action to
justify attributing the school's action to the state.49 Third, the Court
considered whether the school's performance of a traditional "public
38 See Burton, 365 U.S. at 724.
"See id. at 719.
4 ° See id. at 724.
41 See 457 U.S. 830,840-42 (1982).
42 See id. at 833.
See id.
" See id.
45 See id. at 840-43.
45 See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840.
47 See id. at 841.
48 See id.
49 See id. at 841 -42.
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function" rendered it. a state actor" The Court found that, although
the statute commanded the state to pay for special education for
troubled youths, the state had only recently adopted this function.
Therefore, it could not be construed as a "traditional" state function. 51
Fourth, the Court evaluated whether the state and the school had a
"symbiotic" relationship that would elevate the level of state participa-
tion so that the school's actions constituted state action. 52 The Court
reasoned that because the state would not benefit from the school's
allegedly discriminatory actions, as did the state of Delaware in Burton,
no such symbiosis existed."
2. "State Action" Doctrine as Applied to Student Organizations and
Press
In 1987, in Sinn v. The Daily Nebraskan, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit followed the majority of circuit court
decisions in finding that a university newspaper's editorial decisions
did not constitute state action for purposes of a suit brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.51 Petitioners attempted to place "roommate needed"
advertisements which described the sexual orientation of the advertiser
in the campus newspaper of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln."
When the newspaper refused all such advertisements pursuant to its
advertising policy, petitioners brought a § 1983 claim against the news-
paper, individual members of the University Board of Regents and
individual members of the University Publications Committee."
Although the newspaper derived its existence, legal status, power,
authority and the majority of its budget from its association with the
state, the court did not find state action." In reaching its conclusion,
the court, following Rendell-Baker, held that government regulation
and subsidizing of an entity, without more, do not result in a finding
of state action." Further, the court determined that the students'
exercise of editorial discretion did not constitute state action because
50 See id. at 842.
51 See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842,
52 See id. at 842-43.
53 See id.
51 See 829 F.2d 662, 663 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Leeds v. Melts, 85 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1996);
Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, 1074 (5th Cir. 1976). But see Lee v. Board
of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257, 1258 (7th Cir. 1971).
55 See Sinn, 829 F.2d at 663.
56 See id,
57 See id. at 666.
55
 See id. at 665.
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the Daily Nebraskan functioned like a private newspaper. 59 Where a
court. finds, as in this case, that "there is not the slightest whisper that
the [state] authorities had anything to do with the [editorial deci-
sion]," it cannot find state action under the Sinn holding.6°
B. Public Forum Analysis
Access to public properly for the purpose of speech has been
recognized as a right guaranteed by the First Amendment since the
late nineteenth century. Traditionally, the public forum doctrine has
ensured that publicly-owned properties, such as parks and streets, are
available to citizens for expressive activity, such as assemblies and dem-
onstrations. 6 ' The doctrine has recently been expanded to cover mu-
nicipal theaters, university buildings and student newspapers. 62 The
public forum doctrine holds that restrictions on speech should be
subject to higher scrutiny when that speech occurs in a place histori-
cally associated with expressive activity. 63
In the early 1980s, the Supreme Court brought uniformity to the
public forum doctrine by stating that public property may fall into one
of three categories. 64 The three categories are traditional public fora,
limited public fora and non-public fora. 65 Each category provides vary-
ing degrees of protection for expressive activities. First Amendment
expression which occurs in traditional public fora receives maximum
protection from government interference under the public forum
doctrine, while non-public fora offer no protection for expressive ac-
tivity.
1. Supreme Court Development and Treatment of the Public
Forum Doctrine
Under the public forum doctrine, the Supreme Court has iden-
tified three types of fora. The first type, traditional public fora, include
streets and parks which "have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for pur-
poses of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and dis- -
" See id.
" See Sinn, 829 F.2d at 666.
61 See Daniell Coyle, Comment, The First Amendment in Conflict: Advertising Access to State
University Student Newspapers, 24 SANTA CLARA L. ItEv. 763, 767-68 (1984).
62 See id.
See TRIBE, supra note 28, at 987.
64
 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Perry, 960 U.S. at 45.
See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
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cussing public questions."66 Government entities may not prohibit ex-
pressive activity in traditional public fora unless (a) the regulation
serves a compelling government interest, and (b) it is narrowly drawn
to achieve that encl.° The state may also issue regulations upon public
fora speech that restrict the time, place and manner of expression, so
long as the regulations do not discriminate against the content of the
speech, are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government inter-
est and leave open alternative channels of communication,
The second category, limited public fora, consists of public prop-
erty which the state has purposefully opened for use by the public as
a place for expressive speech by certain groups or for discussion of
specific topicsP Once opened, the limited public forum is governed
by the same restrictions upon speech regulations as the traditional
public forum." Accordingly, content-based regulations must be nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, while reasonable
time, place and manner regulations are permitted. 7 '
The third and final category is non-public fora." In these fora, the
state may issue reasonable regulations on speech that do not discrimi-
nate on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint." Non-public fora include
government property that is reserved for specific governmental pur-
poses on the principle that "the state, no less than a private owner of
property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the
use to which it is lawfully dedicated." 74
In 1983, the Supreme Court attempted a synthesis of the public
forum doctrine in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators'
Association." In Perry, Perry Education Association (PEA) was a teach-
ers' union that lost the certification election and later was denied
access to the school district's internal mail system, although the cer-
tified union was granted this access." Although Perry Local Educators'
Association (PLEA) received permission to use other school facilities
to communicate with teachers, it filed suit under § 1983 against PEA
and the town school board, alleging that the school-imposed preferen-
66 /Jerry, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
67
 See id.
68
 See id.
68 See id.
7° See id. at 46.
71 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
72 See id.
73 See Id.
74 Id.
75 See TRIBE, supra note 28, at 987.
76 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 39.
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tial access system violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights."
The Court reasoned that the internal mail system constituted a
non-public forum because the district had not, by policy or practice,
intentionally opened the system for indiscriminate use by the general
public." Furthermore, as a non-public forum, the district was permit-
ted to restrict access with regulations that were reasonable and not
based upon the speaker's viewpoint." The Court first ruled that the
regulations did not constitute viewpoint discrimination, but rather
legitimately distinguished between the status of the unions, one of
which functioned as the teachers' sole representative." Second, the
Court held that the distinction was reasonable because it was wholly
consistent with the district's legitimate interest in reserving the prop-
erty for its dedicated use—official communication 8 1 Thus, under the
holding of Perry, the Supreme Court established that the state does
not open a government forum unless it affirmatively intends to do so. 82
2. Supreme Court Analysis of First Amendment Rights in the Public
Schools
The central cases defining the limits of public school students'
rights to freedom of expression under the First Amendment are Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 88 In both
Tinker and Fraser, the Court did not have to address the public forum
analysis." These cases, however, identified the limits of students' First
Amendment rights in the public school setting and therefore affected
the public forum analysis as applied within the public schools." Hazel-
wood applied a public forum analysis to determine the rights of edu-
cators to censor the content of a student newspaper over the objections
of its editors."
In 1969, in Tinker, the Supreme Court issued perhaps its strongest
defense of students' First Amendment rights to freedom of expression
77 See id. at 41.
78 See id. at 46,47.
79 See id. at 47.
"See id. at 50-51,52.
81 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 50.
82 See id.
88 See infra notes 87-115.
84 See infra notes 87-100.
85 See infra notes 87-100.
88 See infra notes 101-15.
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within public schools.° In Tinker, five students were suspended for
wearing black armbands at school to protest the Vietnam War." The
students brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking nominal
damages and an injunction to restrain school officials from disciplining
the students." The Tinker Court famously observed that neither stu-
dents nor teachers "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." J0 On this basis, the
Court held that a school may not restrict a student's right to free
speech unless school officials could reasonably forecast that the speech
might substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge
upon the rights of other students.91 It noted further that "the discom-
fort and unpleasantness" that may accompany the voicing of an un-
popular viewpoint is insufficient to justify a prohibition on a particular
expression of opinion. 92 Using this standard, the Court found that the
school officials' fear of a disturbance resulting from the students'
wearing of armbands was unreasonable." It held, therefore, that the
school's restriction on the wearing of armbands by students was un-
constitutional."
In 1986, in Fraser, the Stipreme Court afforded greater latitude to
school administrators in regulating the content of student speech and
narrowed students' freedom of expression in the public schools. 95 In
Fraser, the Court held that the school could constitutionally prohibit.
obscene speech at a school-sponsored assembly. 96 The Court acknow-
ledged the holding of Tinker, that students have the right under the
First Ainendment to advocate unpopular and controversial views in the
public schools, yet reasoned that these rights arc not coextensive with
those of adults in other settings.97 The Court observed that educators
in public schools have greater latitude to regulate the content of
student speech in schools to teach their pupils "the boundaries of
socially appropriate behavior."98 The Court also recognized that school
authorities, acting in loco parentis, have a responsibility to protect chil-
87 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969).
BB See id. at 504.
89 See id.
90
 Id, at 506.
91 See id. at 511.
92 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
95 See id.
94 See id.
95 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
98 See id.
97 See id. at 682.
98 Id. at 683.
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dren from exposure to lewd or indecent speech. 99 Therefore, the Court
reasoned, public schools may enforce regulations that prohibit student
speech that is lewd and obscene even though it does not threaten to
disrupt the operation of the school, as required by the Tinker Court. '°°
In 1988, in Hazelwood, the Supreme Court further enhanced
school officials' power to curtail student speech)°' In Hazelwood, the
Court considered whether a school principal could censor the content
of a student newspaper without the consent of student editors or the
journalism advisor. '° 2 To answer this question, the Court utilized the
public forum analysis.'" The Court determined that a high school
newspaper designed and published in the context of a curricular
activity, with close supervision by an advisor, was not a public forum
because the administration did not open up the paper for indiscrimi-
nate use by the general public. 104 Rather, the school reserved the paper
for the specific purpose of teaching journalism students about news-
paper publication under the guidance of a faculty advisor. 10" Therefore,
the school could constitutionally exercise control over the style and
content of student speech in school-sponsored fora, assuming such
regulation reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.'"
The Hazelwood Court specifically distinguished the holding of
Tinker, which relates only to "student speech that happens to occur on
school premises."" The facts of Hazelwood, on the other hand, in-
volved student speech that was affirmatively promoted by school-spon-
sored or curricular activities such as theatrical presentations or school
newspapers.'" Because these school-sponsored activities may reason-
ably be deemed to bear the imprimatur of the school, the Court
reasoned that school officials should have greater latitude to regulate
the speech contained therein.'m
99 See id. at 684.
1 °° See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
1 ° 1 484 U.S. 260, 265-66 (1988).
1 °2 See id. at 268. The principal of Hazelwood East I Iigh School objected to two of the articles
scheduled to appear in the contested edition of the Spectrum. See id. at 262. One of the stories
described three students' experiences with pregnancy and the other discussed the impact of
divorce on students at the school. See id.
103 See id. at 267-70.
1°4 See id. at 268,
195 See id.
196 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
1117 Id. at 270-71.
111 See id.
149 See id.
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The Hazelwood Court accordingly issued a new standard by which
school officials could constitutionally regulate the content of student
speech in school-sponsored activities."' Under this standard, educators
may regulate school-sponsored student speech in a manner that has a
reasonable relationship to legitimate pedagogical purposes.'" The
Court opined further that educators may exercise this level of control
over school-sponsored speech in order to accomplish three objectives:
(1) the activity imparts whatever lesson the educators intend to teach;
(2) readers or listeners do not become exposed to age-inappropriate
material and (3) the views of students do not become erroneously
imputed to the school." 2
In the wake of Hazelwood, therefore, educators maintain sig-
nificant authority to regulate the content of student speech." 3 Within
the confines of school-sponsored activities, educators have wide discre-
tion to impose such regulations."' Tinker's "disruption" standard, how-
ever, still governs speech that merely happens to occur on campus,
rather than speech that is affirmatively promoted by school-sponsored
activities." 5
Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada v. Clark County School Dis-
trict, decided in 1991, represents the most recent circuit court opinion
relating to First Amendment issues and the student prcss." 6 In Planned
Parenthood, the Ninth Circuit held that a public school system could
reasonably refuse to publish an advertisement promoting family plan-
ning in a student publication that is designated as non-public fora. 17
The court found that the publications were not public fora because
the schools did not reserve them for indiscriminate use by the general
public." 8 Rather, the school district maintained a detailed policy out-
lining standards for accepting advertisements, thus evidencing an in-
tention to retain control over the publications and their advertise-
mcnts."9 The court applied the Hazelwood rationale, noting that where
school publications have not been opened to the public for indiscrimi-
nate expressive use, school officials may refuse to publish advertise-
110 See id.
111 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
"2 See id.
115 See generally Martha M. McCarthy, Post-Hazelwood Developments: A Threat to Free Inquiry
in Public Schools, 81 Enuc. L. REP. 685, 686 (1993).
114 See id.
115 See id. at 694.
"6 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991).
117 See id. at 830.
115 See id. at 824.
119 See id. at 823-24.
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ments in school-sponsored publications bearing its imprimatur for
legitimate pedagogical reasons.'" Applying this standard, the court
reasoned that the school officials' policy of rejecting advertisements on
both sides of the abortion debate was reasonable to maintain the
school's neutrality on a divisive issue. 121
Planned Parenthood represents important precedent in the context
of Yeo for at least two reasons. First, the case affirms the principle,
rightly followed by the First Circuit en bane in Yeo, that outside entities
do not have the right to publish their advertisements in publicly-
funded, school-sponsored publications.'" Second, it adheres to the
teaching of Hazelwood that school publications are generally not public
fora, whether or not they publish advertisements submitted by those
outside the academic community.'"
II. YE0 V. TOWN OF LEXINGTON
Like many public schools, Lexington High School provides ample
support to its various publications. For instance, LHS permitted its
newspaper, the Musket, to publish on LHS's property and the school
subsidized the Musket's publication expenses as well as the $1373 yearly
stipend to a faculty advisor.'" Notwithstanding the financial support
from the school, students made all editorial and business decisions
regarding news articles, editorials and advertisements to be run in the
Musket.' 25
 Save for school administration policy prohibiting the publi-
cation of obscenity or other material that violated state or federal law,
students otherwise controlled the content of the Musket.' 26 Student
editors adopted a policy of refusing advertisements from political can-
didates, organizations, advocacy groups and cigarette manufacturers
during the 1993-1994 academic year and adopted the policy in writing
the following year.' 27 Pursuant to this policy, the Musket never accepted
a political or advocacy advertisement.'"
Another LHS publication, the yearbook, was published annually
and managed by a student editor-in-chief.'" As with the Musket, the
129 See id. at 828.
121 See Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 829.
122 See id. at 830.
125 See id.
124 See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 94-10811-RGS, at 2-3 (D. Mass. Apr. 22, 1996).
125 See id.
'26 See id. at 3 n.5.
127
 See id. at 3.
'" See id.
129 See Yeo, No. 94-10811-RCS, at 3.
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high school permitted the yearbook staff to use school facilities for
publication and subsidized the annual stipend for a faculty advisor.'"
The yearbook was otherwise financially self-sufficient."' The yearbook
printed advertisements placed by local businesses and congratulatory
messages submitted by students and parents, but never published an
advocacy advertisement.' 32 In the 1994-1995 academic year, the student
editors adopted a written policy limiting paid advertisements to mes-
sages of congratulations submitted by graduating seniors and their
parents.'"
The dispute giving rise to litigation stemmed from the Lexington
School Committee's decision to distribute, without parental consent,
condoms and information about sexually transmitted diseases to stu-
dents.'" Yeo, a father of an LHS student, opposed the policy and
galvanized an advocacy group that placed the issue on the 1993 town
ballot.'" Despite Yco's efforts, the condom distribution policy received
the support of a majority of Lexington voters)"
After the referendum, Yeo co-founded the Lexington Parents In-
formation Network ("LEXNET"), an organization intended to educate
parents about public school issues. 13/ On behalf of LEXNET, Yeo sent
an advertisement promoting sexual abstinence to the yearbook with
the advertising fee on November 1, 1993; he attempted to place the
same advertisement with the newspaper on February 1, 1994. 138 Both
editorial boards rejected the advertisement.'"
The student co-editors of the Musket decided to reject the adver-
tisement because it violated their policy of refusing to publish advocacy
or political advertisements.'" Yeo declined the students' offer to write
the advertisement in a more appropriate tone and subsequently wrote
to the faculty advisor demanding that the newspaper reconsider its
decision."' In April 1994, Yeo brought this action in federal district
court, claiming that the LHS yearbook and Musket deprived him of his
right to freedom of expression and equal protection under the First
1 " See id.
191 See id.
132 See id. at 3-4.
133 See id. at 4.
194 See Yeo, No. 94-10811-RGS, at 4.
1311 See id.
1 " See id.
111 See id. at 6.
199 See id.
139 See Yeo, No. 94-10811•RGS, at 6.
1411 See id. at 6-7.
141 See id. at 7.
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and Fourteenth Amendments, § 1983 and Article 16 of the Massachu-
setts Declaration of Rights.' 42 Yeo asked the court to issue a temporary
restraining order preventing both school publications from publishing
future issues without LEXNET's advertisement.'" The district court
ruled against Yeo.' 44
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's ruling on the preliminary injunction.'" The court further re-
manded the matter to the district court.'" On remand, the defendants
sought a motion for summary judgmen0 47
A. The District Court Grants the Town of Lexington's Motion for
Summary Judgment
In 1996, in Yea v. Town of Lexington, the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the defendants' motion
for summary judgment, holding that a high school publication's re-
fusal to publish a submitted advertisement did not constitute slate
action.'" In granting summary judgment for the defendants, the court
rejected Yeo's argument that the student editors' actions could be
characterized as state action.'" The court first observed that state
regulations did not compel the students' decision to reject LEXNET's
advertisement, as the only policy governing the students pertained to
the publication of obscene or illegal materia1. 15° Second, the court
concluded that state funding of a private body alone does not establish
state action.' 5 ' Third, the court determined that Yeo had not proven
the existence of a symbiotic relationship.'" Because nothing in the
record indicated that the administration influenced the student edi-
tors' decision, the court ruled that the school had not meaningfully
participated in the refusal to publish Yeo's advertisement.'" Thus, the
district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
142 See id. at 10.
145 See id.
144 See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623,1997 WL 292173, at *3 (1st Cir. 1997).
145 See id.
146 See id.
' 47 See id.
148 See Yen, No. 94-10811-RCS, at 17,19.
145 See id. at 13.
1511/ See id.
151 See id.
152 See id. at 16.
155 See Yeo, No. 94-10811-RCS, at 16.
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holding that the student editors' decision to reject the advertisements
did not constitute state action.'''
B. The First Circuit Panel Overrules the District Court's Findings
In June 1997, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the district court, holding that
the student editors' refusal to publish Yeo's advertisements constituted
state action. 155 The panel also found that advertising pages were public
fora which could not be subject to content-based restrictions."'
The panel began its analysis by rejecting the lower court's reliance
upon Rendell-Baker and Sinn in its assessment of whether the student
editors' decisions constituted state action. 157 The panel reasoned that
the district court incorrectly relied upon these cases because neither
addressed the unique set of constitutional concerns that public high
school publications raise.'" The panel cited Hazelwood for the propo-
sition that state action exists in the production of all high school
publications, theatrical and other expressive activities where students
and parents might reasonably perceive the production to bear the
imprimatur of the school. 15" Using the state action analysis thus iden-
tified in Hazelwood, the panel determined that editorial decisions for
both school publications constitute state action because neither publi-
cation escaped the reasonable perception that they bore the imprima-
tur of the school."'
The panel then turned to the question of whether the advertising
pages of the LHS publications constituted public fora."' The panel first
noted that it must confine its public forum analysis to the LHS publi-
cations' advertising sections because the access sought by the speaker
defines the relevant forum.' 62 The panel determined that the advertis-
ing sections of both periodicals qualified as limited public fora be-
cause student editors opened advertising space to a segment of the
154 See id. at 10, 19.
155 See Yea, 1997 WL 292173, at *18.
156
 See id.
157
 See id. at *5.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See Yeo, 1997 WL 292175, at *6. The panel court was mistaken in their assumption that
Hazelwood created a new test for state action. As correctly pointed out by the en bane court, state
action was pot at issue in the Hazelwood decision because the disputed editorial judgment was
admittedly undertaken by a state actor. See Yco v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.2d 241, 250 n.8 (let
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 2060 (1998).
161 See Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *8.
162
 See id.
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public that included commercial businesses, non-profit organizations
and members of the school comtnunity."55 The panel reasoned that the
publications violated Yeo's First Amendment rights by opening their
advertising pages to this broad segment of the public but refusing to
publish Yeo's advertisement, a decision which constituted discrimina-
tion against a controversial or objectionable viewpoint.' 1 ' Thus, a panel
of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that
the student editors' refusal constituted a state action and the advertis-
ing pages of the school publications constituted limited public fora.' 65
C. First Circuit Grants Rehearing En Banc and Affirm Decision of the
District Court
In December 1997, on rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit withdrew the panel opinion and affirmed the
district court's decision on the ground that the students' refusal to
publish Yeo's advertisements did not constitute state action.' 66 First, the
court observed that cases considering whether student decisions on
school-sponsored publications in public high schools constitute state
action provide little guidance because their facts remain distinguish-
able. 167 The court observed, however, that most circuits have addressed
the state action question in the context of state-sponsored publications
in public universities and found that student editors' decisions did not
constitute state action.' 68
The court analyzed whether the LHS students' editorial decision
constituted state action by using three of the four tests articulated in
Rendell-Baker.' 1 ° The first test addressed whether school officials actu-
ally made or controlled the decision not to publish.'" The court de-
termined that the record did not support this conclusion."' The sec-
164 See id. at *10.
164 See id. at *14. Indeed, in its March 1, 1994 letter to Yeo, the Musket explained that it
recently had rejected Yeo's advertisement; however, "since that rejection we have been informed
that LEXNET is . . . not a political organization. Therefore, it is entirely possible that there is
nothing in our advertising policy that would preclude us from running your ad. However ... it
has come to our attention that a number of citizens both within and outside the high school find
both your organization and the message you wish to place objectionable.' Id. at *15.
165 See id. at *18.
1116 See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 243.
167 See id. at 250. The court observed, for instance, that in Hazelwood, state action was not at
issue because the disputed actions were admittedly undertaken by public school officials, i.e., the
high school principal. See id.
' 68 See id.
169 See id. at 251.
170 See id.
171 See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 251-52.
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and test addressed whether the state had a duty to intervene in the
student actors' decisions, giving rise to a finding of state action in the
absence of any affirmative action by agents of the state.'" Citing the
Massachusetts statute regarding the editorial autonomy of high school
publication editors, the court observed that the statute imposes no
such duty.'" Further, the court indicated that the First Amendment
does not impose a duty on government to intervene in the affairs of
the press where no state action otherwise exists."' The court, therefore,
concluded that the school administrators had no duty to control the
editorial judgments of student editors.'"
The third category of analysis addressed whether the student
editors' conduct could be fairly attributable to the state by virtue of the
nexus between state regulation and financial support of the publica-
tions and the decisions themselves.'" The court relied on the reason-
ing in Rendell-Baker that establishes the principle that the receipt of
public funds does not, by itself, transform the institution's actions into
those of the state)" Instead, the Supreme Court in Rendell-Baker fo-
cused on the interplay between the provision of funds and the decision
at issue.'" The court, therefore, concluded that the student editors
made their decision independent of their receipt of state funds.'"
The court observed, however, that the issue of state action turns
on context and that it must consider all factors which could contribute
to the nexus between state support and the student editors' decision.'m
The court noted that the publications bore the name of the school,
served as a means of communication for the LHS community and
provided educational value.' 81 The court also conceded that the faculty
17'4 See id. at 251,
178
 See id. at 252-53; see also MASS. GEN, LAws ch. 71, § 82 (1974). The statute reads, in
pertinent part, "The right of students to freedom of expression in the public schools of the
commonwealth shall not be abridged, provided that such right shall not cause any disruption or
disorder in the school, Freedom of expression shall include without limitation, the rights and
responsibilities of students, collectively and individually, (a) to express their views through speech
and symbols, (b) to write, publish and disseminate their views, (c) to assemble peaceably on
school property for the purpose of expressing their opinions." MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 71, § 82.
174 See Yea, 131 F.3d at 253. To support this argument, the court cited Columbia Broadcasting
System v. Democratic National Committee, in which the Supreme Court held that the decisions of
broadcasters not to accept any editorial advertiiing were not government action for the purposes
of the First Amendment, although the government licensed and regulated the broadcasters. See
412 U.S. 94, 119 (1973).
175
 See Yeo, 131 F,3d at 253.
1 " See id.
177
 See id.
178 See id. at 254.
179 See id.
1 " See Yeo, 131 F,3d at 254.
181
 See id.
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advisors may have subtly influenced student editors.'" The court ac-
knowledged that all of these factors supported Yco's argument that the
student editors' decision constituted state action.'" The court ob-
served, however, that student editors maintained a history of editorial
autonomy from school officials and even had an adversarial relation-
ship with them.'" The court reasoned that the student editors relied
on the state for resources but maintained intellectual autonomy.'"
Thus, the court held that the students' refusal to publish the LEXNET
advertisements did not violate Yeo's First Amendment rights because
the student editors' refusal did not constitute state action,'"
III. EDUCATIONAL IDEOLOGY AND ITS RELATION TO THE ISSUES
RAISED IN YEO V. TOWN OF LEXINGTON
During the past seventy-five years, the judiciary has defined the
rights of various members of the public school community. As demon-
strated by the cases in the preceding section, and by the Yeo case itself,
there is considerable controversy regarding the contours of the rights
of students, parents and administrators in the school environment. In
no other instance are these issues more complex than in disputes over
students' freedom of expression in the public schools. Students' inter-
ests in freedom of expression must be balanced against educators'
rights to ensure that the teachers' messages are not lost in the din of
competing voices in the classroom.'"'' This balance is artfully drama-
tized by the Hazelwood opinion: while public school students do not
"shed their rights at the schoolhouse gate," these rights "are not auto-
matically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings" and
must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment."'"
192 See id.
183
 See id.
im See id.
165 See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 254.
186 See id. at 255.
187 The First Amendment interests of the students in this analysis are complex. See Bruce C.
Haien, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE U. 685,
686. The students' rights include, of course, a freedom of self-expression. The students' rights,
however, also include a right to have their capacity for communication developed in their public
school. See id. Professor Hafen argues that schools are "first amendment institutions" that can
"advance and protect the values of the first amendment" only if the teachers have the authority
to silence students whose expression conflicts with the educational purpose of the school. See id.
According to Harem "until children have developed this freedom for expression, their freedom
from restraints on expression has only limited value." Id. at 700,
188
 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlitteier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
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As the Court determines where students' speech rights end and
the educators' right to regulate the speech of their students begins, it
articulates a vision of what the American public school ought to be.
Beginning in the 1920s and perhaps culminating with its Tinker deci-
sion, the Court articulated a "progressive" educational model that
emphasized student participation in the educational process and was
intended to develop students' independent thought processes. 189 In the
last twenty years, however, the Court has shifted from the progressive
model and issued decisions that emphasize the role of schools as
transmitters of cultural values. 19" The latter theory of education, now
dominant in Supreme Court jurisprudence, permits teachers and ad-
ministrators to assert substantial control over the content of student
speech in classroom and school-sponsored activities. 19 '
The Supreme Court's adoption of the "values inculcation" peda-
gogical model has significant consequences for determining the per-
missible parameters of conduct for students and teachers in classrooms
across the United States. Today's students have less freedom to express
themselves in school-sponsored events and fora than their counterparts
did thirty years ago. Faculty and administrators have ample liberty to
regulate student expression that is channeled through school-spon-
sored activities such as plays, newspapers and other publications. More-
over, the Court's adoption of the values inculcation theory has conse-
quences for the application of the state action and public forum
doctrines in the case of Yeo. First, the question of whether the LHS
students' editorial decisions constituted state action may be affected by
a legal regime that anticipates significant control by educators over the
content of student expression in school-sponsored publications.''' Sec-
ond, the issue of whether the Musket and yearbook constituted public
fora is similarly affected by the values inculcation ideolog-y. 195 Because
i" See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (holding that
students cannot. be compelled to salute [lag) ('That [schools are) educating the young for
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the indivicial, if we
are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles
of our government as mere platitudes?), Pierce v, Society oldie Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 595 (1925)
(declining to uphold statute requiring attendance at public schools) ("fhe fundamental theory
of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the
state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public school teachers
only, The child is not the mere creature of the state."); see also infra notes 194-202. Bu! see Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Today [education) is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping hint adjust normally to his environment.").
191/ See infra text accompanying notes 203-13.
191 See infra text accompanying notes 203-13.
190 See infra text accompanying notes 252-90.
199 See infra text accompanying notes 291-307.
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educators are presumed to wield considerable discretion in regulating
the speech content of school publications under Hazelwood, it is dif-
ficult to conceive of student newspapers as public fora in which the
public would have a virtually unlimited right to access.
A. Two Educational Models Which Influence Supreme Court Holdings
in Free Speech Cases Involving Public School Students
1. Progressivism
The progressive educational model builds upon the works of John
Dewey and asserts that the primary goal of education is to develop
students' thought processes.'" Advocates of this theory opine that the
educational environment should emphasize students' active roles in
learning and thinking, processes that are ideally stimulated by intellec-
tual conflict. 195 Because this school of thought views education as a
participatory process with a maximum level of interaction designed to
develop students' thought processes, it values independent student
expression and thought. 196 Conversely, the role of the teacher is limited
to that of facilitator rather than disciplinarian; the undue exercise of
authority by any school official is met with distrust in this framework.' 97
Although it is reflected in Supreme Court decisions dating back
to the 1920s,' 98 the Tinker decision likely represents the high-water
mark of the progressivist educational ideology in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence.' 99 In support of students' rights to free expression, the
Court prohibits any regulation of student speech that does not mate-
rially or substantially interfere with the activities, operations or require-
ments of appropriate discipline of the schoo1. 29° "In our system," writes
Justice Fortas, "state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitari-
anism .. students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of
only that which the State chooses to communicate. "201 The Court here
194 See, e.g., Susan 11, Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling the Free Speech Clause
with Curricular Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NO l'RE DAME L. REV. 769, 771-72
(1995).
195 See William B. Senhauser, Note, Education and the Court: The Supreme Court's Educational
Ideology, 40 VAND. L. REV. 939, 947 (1987).
196 See id. at 948.
197 See Bruce C. Hafer', Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public
Schools as Mediating Structures, 48 Onto ST. LJ. 663, 680 (1987).
190 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
199 See Tinker v. Des Moines Coniniunity Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
20" See id. at 512-13.
201 Id. at 511.
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affirms a pedagogical ideology that favors student expression as a
means of developing students' intellectual capacities. 202 In limiting
teachers' ability to control student speech, this ideology also gives voice
to progressivism's anti-authoritarian doctrine.
2. Values Inculcation
The second and more conservative pedagogical method strives to
instill students with specific knowledge, skills, morals and social rules. 203
Values inculcationists view education as the process of encouraging the
internalization of societal norms—with particular emphasis on the
child's need to learn societal discipline—rather than encouraging in-
dividual growth. 2(4 This theory of public school education has its roots
in the origin of the common school movement more than 100 years
ago. 205 The father of the common school movement in Massachusetts,
Horace Mann, believed that universal education would preserve our
nation's democratic institutions and political community by training
students in morality, discipline, patriotism and cultural assimilation. 206
One commentator has remarked that the public schools originally re-
ceived their authority to inculcate virtues in their students because
schools were seen as an extension of the family. 2°2 As recipients of
delegated parental authority, schools developed students' personal
autonomy through their public citizenship. 2"
Although the values inculcation school found a voice in the
Court's decisions as early as Brown v. Board of Education, it did not gain
preeminence among theories of the public school until the Supreme
Court's ruling in Fraser, handed down almost twenty years after
Tinker." In Fraser, Chief Justice Burger observed that the purpose of
the public school system is to "inculcate the habits and manners of
civility as values in themselveS conducive to happiness and as indispen-
sable to the practice of self-government in the community and the
nation."21 " Moreover, the Court reintroduced the notion of in loco
parentis, a doctrine that was largely absent from Supreme Court juris-
prudence in the post-Tinker era. 211 Thus, the Supreme Court conceived
202 See id.
203 See, e.g., Scnhauscr, supra note 195, at 943.
204 See id. at 944.
205 See liafen, supra note 197, at 675.
206
 See id.
207 See id. at 671,
"B See id.
20' See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
20 Id.
2." See id. at 684; see also 1Iafen, supra note 197, at 721-22.
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the role of the public school as one which draws its authority from
parental delegation and thereby retains the responsibility for educat-
ing its students in the shared values of the social community both
inside and outside the classroom. 212 Accordingly, Chief Justice Burger
wrote, "schools must. teach by example the shared values of a civilized
social order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers . . . demonstrate the
appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their
conduct and deportment in and out of class. Inescapably, like parents,
they are role models."2 ' 3
B. Values Inculcation as the Dominant Paradigm in Evaluating Student
Speech Interests
I. Social Science Research Justifies Application of Values
Inculcation to Public Schools
Even though there can be no clear resolution to the debate over
which of the two dominant pedagogical methods is superior, many
commentators have recently written in support of the values inculca-
tion method. 214 Social scientific research supports this theory by dem-
onstrating that children, even those of high school age, require guid-
ance in order to function in school because they lack adequately
developed cognitive processes for fully rational thought. 215 Therefore,
sound moral instruction must be provided in the school and in the
home. 2 '" Jean Piaget, a leading authority on the intellectual develop-
ment of children, has demonstrated that children experience sig-
nificant mental barriers that inhibit fully rational thought. 21 Preteen
children, for instance, have a limited attention span and experience
difficulty in comprehending more than one thing at a time. 2 ' 8 Al-
though the majority of Piaget's research is devoted to the study of
children younger than twelve years, Piaget noted that pre-adult intel-
lectual characteristics often begin to diminish around the age of
twelve."' Piaget also suggested that individuals of average intellect do
not reach fully mature thought processes until they are between fifteen
212 See Hafen, supra note 197, at 721-22.
215 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (italics added).
214 See, e.g., Bitensky, supra note 194, at 771; I•:den, supra note 197, at 670.
215 See Bitensky, supra note 194, at 781, 782.
216 See id. at 790.
217 See, e.g., JEAN PIAGET, JUDGMENT AND REASONING IN THE CHILD (Marjorie Warden trans.,
Littlefield, Adams & Co. 1976); JEAN PIAGET, THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD (Joan
Tomlinson & Andrew Tomlinson trans., Littlefield, Adams & Co. 1979).
218 See Bitensky, supra note 194, at 783.
219 See id. at 784.
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and twenty years old. 22° Further, adolescents may be subject to mental
processes such as a propensity to become consumed with philosophical
ideas and a unique vulnerability to sexual anxieties and urges. 221 It is
unlikely that a younger person, hindered by such intellectual and
emotional baggage, would learn to make sound behavioral and moral
choices without firm instruction at home and in the schools.
During the 1970s and 1980s, American public schools were re-
quired to permit a wide range of student. speech that was inconsistent
with the values and lessons that the schools were attempting to teach. 222
One scholar has argued that American public schools have suffered in
quality at least in part due to the progressive educational reforms
ushered in by the Warren Court in Tinker. 2" Indeed, studies document
a strong correlation between the introduction of progressivist educa-
tional reforms in public schools and a steep decline in the academic
performance of public school students. 2" One study conducted by the
National Commission on Excellence in Education correlated the pro-
gressivist innovations in education with a steady decline in SAT scores
between 1963 and 1980. 2" Another study demonstrated that students
in private schools—which remain exempt from the restrictions on
school regulations governing student speech under Tinker—perform
better on standardized tests by approximately two grade levels than
their counterparts in public schools.22" The authors of this 1982 study
determined that half of the variance between test scores was attribut-
able to the effects of rigorous discipline and academic policies in
private schools.227 The other half of the variance between test scores
could be attributed to students' demographic and socioeconomic back-
ground characteristics.228 To summarize these findings, it appears that
schools which are not hindered by the court-ordered legal "tinkering"
of progressivism accomplish their educational mission more success-
fully.
225 See id. at 785.
221 See id. at 786.
222 See 11aCen, supra note 197, at 684.
223 See id,
224 See id.
225 See id. (quoting THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION
AT RISK: TIIE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 5 0983)).
226 See id. at 686 (quoting]. COLEMAN, T. llorrER, S. KILGORE, HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT:
PUBLIC, CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED 188 (1982)).
227 See 1Iafcn, supra note 197, at 686.
228 See id.
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2. Hazelwood Provides Rationale for Application of Values
Inculcation Model. to Public High Schools
The Supreme Court's decision in Hazelwood is probably the most
significant free speech case in the public schools since Tinker. In fact,
Hazelwood limited the reach of Tinker by creating a realm of student
endeavor to which the latter decision no longer applies. In the course
of the opinion, the Hazelwood Court identified two fundamental edu-
cational interests that justify the limitation on student speech within
school-sponsored activities.'"
First, Hazelwood reasoned that the school should retain authority
over the content of school-sponsored activities to teach students what-
ever lessons they were designed to teach."° In the case of student
publications like the newspaper or yearbook, the activities would be
designed to teach journalistic skills, editorial responsibility and produc-
tion management."' Further, the Supreme Court has written elsewhere
that protection of editorial freedom is central to our concept of First
Amendment guarantees of a free press."' Thus, the "skills" being
taught in this particular school-sponsored activity are fundamental to
the full exercise of the right of freedom of the press and to the
successful functioning of our democratic process.'"
Second, the Court gave school officials the authority to restrict
student speech in school-sponsored publications to regulate the values-
content of the publications:2'4 Specifically, schools arc now permitted
to monitor the content of student publications (1) to ensure that
readers arc not exposed to material that is inappropriate to their age
level and (2) to distance the educational institutions from writers'
views that may otherwise be erroneously attributed to the school.'" The
229 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
23' See id.
231 A student newspaper could also be conceived of as a vehicle with which a school could
teach grammar and proper writing style to its students. See William Buss, School Newspapers, Public
Forum, and the First Amendment, 74 IOWA L. REV. 505,519 (1989). Buss analogizes the newspaper's
role as pedagogical tool to that of a science textbook used to teach students facts or techniques
or a writing manual used to teach students writing style. See id.
252 See The Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 481 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) ("A newspaper is
more than a passive receptacle for news, comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go
into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on size and content of the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials ... constitute the exercise of editorial control and
judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can
be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to
this time.").
233 See id.
234 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271,
235
 See id.
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Court thus gives schools wide latitude to dissociate themselves from
material that does not meet their standards, either because of poor
grammar or writing style or because it promotes irresponsible values
which are inconsistent with those of a civilized society." 6 By granting
this latitude, the Court permits schools to act as role models to school
communities as a means of instruction in values and decorum.° 7
The Court in Hazelwood held that schools can promote core First
Amendment values by actively directing educational processes and
managing the content of student speech within curricular activities. 238
This returns more control to teachers and administrators. Of course,
Hazelwood does not direct schools to run their curricular activities—
including student newspapers—in any particular way or in accordance
with any given educational methodology." 9 Indeed, schools ought to
provide some curricular activities with diminished supervision, thereby
encouraging student leadership and promoting independent
thought."° Student publications, along with student government,
might provide appropriate fora in which leadership skills may be
taught. Decisions to grant students this freedom, however, should be
the affirmative choice of individual schools based upon pedagogical
theory, instead of legislative or court-ordered mandates to stay out of
students' way."' Hazelwood confers upon schools this option along with
the responsibility for overseeing and implementing their pedagogical
decisions.
IV. YE0 V. TOWN OF LEXINGTON RECONSIDERED IN LIGI IT OF
PEDAGOGICAL Ti IEORY
In holding that an outside advertiser does not have constitution-
ally-mandated access to the pages of a student newspaper, the First
23"See id. at 271, 272.
257 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
236 See Bruce C. Hafen, Schools as Intellectual and Moral Associations, 1993 BYU L. Rtv. 605,
615.
255 See id. at 615-16.
"'See id.
24t Legislatures in four states have adopted and-Hazelwood statutes that codify the Tinker
standard prohibiting schools from enforcing regulations that restrict student speech except where
it threatens a "material or substantial disruption of school activity." These states arc California,
Massachusetts, Iowa and Kansas. Thirteen additional states have considered, but rejected, similar
statutes. See Bruce Harm' & Jonathan Harm The Hazelwood Progeny: Autonomy and Student
Expression in the 1990s, 69 ST Joi IN'S L REV. 379, 406 n.149-51 (1995). The Massachusetts statute,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, §82, was adopted in 1974, and originally applied only to those cities and
towns which chose to accept it. In 1988, the statute became mandatory throughout the state as
amended, Mass. GEN. Laws eh. 7, § 86 (1988). See Pyle v. South Hadley School Committee, 55
F.3d 20, 21 (1st Cir. 1995).
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Circuit undoubtedly reached the correct result.242
 In its en banc deci-
sion, however, the First Circuit's reasoning in Yeo remains incom-
plete. 2 A 3 The court should have found that the decision of LHS student
editors to refuse publication of petitioner Yeo's advertisement consti-
tuted state action. 2" Further, the panel should have found that the LI-IS
Musket and yearbook were not traditional public fora, but instead
constituted non-public fora to which the editors were not required to
grant outsider access."' On this basis, the court could find that the
students' decision did not qualify as a violation of Yco's constitutional
rights. Moreover, as this Note will argue below, this reasoning would
place the panel's decision in harmony with the educational theory
currently favored in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The Yeo en banc decision did not take into account the special
characteristics of the public high school environmen1. 246 This is evident
from an examination of the precedent upon which the court relied. 2`' 7
Indeed, the court specifically distinguished the leading cases arising in
a high school environment as unrelated to its analysis of state action. 248
Rather, the court relied on cases involving editors at university and
commercial presses and thus equated the actions of high school stu-
dent. editors with those of university and commercial newspaper edi-
tors.249 The court's reasoning, therefore, ignores the age of these stu-
dent "actors" and their relatively limited capacities as adolescents for
reasoned moral judgment. 25° Further, the court's reasoning overlooks
the role of faculty advisors' suggestions and advice in light of values
inculcation pedagogy. 231 In sum, this decision ignores the simple reality
of the student editors' educational setting.
242 See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 61, at 789-84; Janet F. Stone & Cynthia L. Zedalis, Comment,
Student Editorial Discretion, the First Amendment, and Public Access to the Campus Press, 16 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 1089, 1116 (1989).
245 See Yea v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 293 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
2060 (1998).
244
 See id. at 255.
245 See id.
210 See id. at 250.
247
 See id.
248 See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 250.
249 See supra text accompanying notes 166-86.
2" See supra text accompanying notes 166-86.
251 See supra text accompanying notes 166-86.
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A. Yeo's Stale Action Analysis Reconsidered in Light of Values
Inculcation Pedagogy
On a common sense level, one can immediately perceive differ-
ences between the student and commercial presses that complicate the
en banc court's analysis of state action in Yeo. 252 Evidence that the en
banc court's analysis ignores these differences may be derived from the
analogies it employs to analyze the relationship between the Musket
editors' decision and LHS faculty. 253 To support the claim that the
school had no duty to control the content of student editors' judg-
ments, for instance, the court compared the regulatory relationship
between the LHS administration and editors of the Musket to the
relationship of regulation that exists between the Federal Communi-
cations Commission and the Columbia Broadcasting Network. 254 Fur-
ther, the court compared the "adversarial" relationship, that supposedly
existed between the LHS administration and editors of the Musket to
the adversarial relationship that exists between public defenders and
the state. 255 Both decisions represent good law in the area of state
action but cannot withstand comparison to the litigants in Yeo, primar-
ily because the "actors" in this analysis are high school juniors and
seniors, not adults.
252 See supra text accompanying notes 166-86.
269
	 Yeo, 131 E3d at 253, 254.
254 See id. at 253 (citing Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 119
(1973)), In CBS, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the actions of CBS in refusing the
editorial advertisements of the DNC could not be attributed to the government, despite heavy
regulation by the Federal Communications Commission. See CBS, 412 U.S. at 119. Although the
legal principle applies to the analysis of state action in Yeo, few similarities exist between the
relationship of the FCC to the Columbia Broadcasting Network and the relationship of the LIIS
faculty and administration to the student editors of the Musket. See id. The nature of the
"regulation" in the latter instance is, of course, educational: intended to instruct journalism
students in the nuances of journalistic style and ethics.
255 See Yeo, 131 F.Sd at 254 (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U,S. 312, 324-25 (1981)). In
Dodson, the actions of a public defender representing a defendant in a criminal proceeding were
not attributable to the state—even though the office was staffed by public employees—because
the office's relationship to the state is necessarily independent and adversarial. See Dodson, 454
U.S. at 324-25. The court compared this relationship between actors and the state to that which
existed in Yea. See Yeo, 131 F,3d at 254. The court reasoned that the students exercised similarly
independent judgment and that it maintained a similarly adversarial relationship to the school
administration in making editorial decisions with which the latter party disagreed. See id.
The comparison cannot withstand serious scrutiny. With respect to the independence of the
public defender from the influence of the state, both the canons of professional responsibility
and the constitutional obligation of the state to respect the professional independence of the
public defenders whom it employs mandate the independent judgment of these state employees.
See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBMITY DR 5-107(11) (1976) ("A lawyer shall not
permit a person who employs him to render legal services to direct his professional judgment in
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Social scientists have demonstrated in empirical research that
persons under the age of eighteen do not have fully developed emo-
tional and intellectual capabilities equivalent to those of adults. 256 For
several decades, state legislatures have recognized this fact by enacting
laws that withhold certain rights and privileges from citizens who arc
younger than eighteen. 257 With its decision in Hazelwood, the United
States Supreme Court applied this learning to the controlled environ-
ment of the high school journalism curriculum, recognizing that high
school teachers should be given the authority to teach their students
about grammar, journalism, values and civility in a reasonable man-
ner. 258
 Despite this data to the contrary, the First Circuit treated the
LHS student journalists like adult journalists. In failing to recognize
how the arm of the state is implicated in decisions made by student
journalists, the court's finding avoids the reality of the student journal-
ists' age and educational setting.
rendering such services."); see also Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (establishing
that state criminal defendants have right to counsel at proceedings against them and that counsel
will be free front state control). As to their adversarial function, there exists a strong public
interest in the quest for truth and fairness that our system assumes can only be achieved by
opposing the state.
The student editors of the Musket certainly exercised independent judgment in making the
decision giving rise to litigation, but such independence is not intrinsic to their role—let alone
a duty incumbent upon student editors—as it may be for editors of the commercial press.
Furthermore, the "adversarial" relationship which supposedly characterized the occasional differ-
ences of opinion between LHS faculty and student editors cannot be seriously analogized to the
duty of public defenders to zealously represent their clients against the state.
256 See supra text accompanying notes 214-28.
252 See, e.g., Mazart v. State, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600, 607 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1981). In Mazart, the court
held that a university was not negligent for failing to provide libel guidelines to student editors
because, as adults, it was not foreseeable that they would not comprehend the normal procedures
for information gathering and dissemination. See id. Because college students are at least eighteen
years old, the editors' failure to adhere to standards followed by reasonable persons was not
reasonably foreseeable. See id.
This holding suggests that—in the state court system of New York—high school officials who
do not provide guidance on common-sense journalistic efforts, such as information gathering
and dissemination, to its student editors, may be held liable for instances of libel. According.to
the Mazart court, high school officials have a duty to guide the decisions made by student editors
because the officials could reasonably foresee that pre-adult students may not adhere to standards
of journalistic ethics which are common knowledge and followed by reasonable persons. See id.
Thus, Mozart indicates that New York high school journalism teachers have a legal duty to guide
their pupils in the basic standards of their craft. See id.
258 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlrneier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
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1. Receipt of Government Funding and Significant State
Encouragement
The rise of values inculcation pedagogy in public education juris-
prudence affects the analysis of whether a decision made by student
editors of a school-sponsored publication constitutes state action.
Within the values inculcation framework, as interpreted by Fraser and
Hazelwood, school authorities receive considerable autonomy to regu-
late the content of student speech in school-sponsored curricular
events. 259 This heightened level of permissible supervision by instruc-
tors suggests that student editors arc not—nor should they be—com-
pletely autonomous actors in the context of curricular activities. 260
Where educators' involvement with the editorial process of school
publications increases, so too does the responsibility of these state
actors for the actions of their pupils. A sufficient nexus is thus created
to attribute the students' actions to the state as a result of faculty
influence upon student editors' decisions, in combination with other
factors such as public financing, the use of school facilities for produc-
tion and the bearing of the school's imprimatur. 26 '
It becomes important to remember, however, that Hazelwood
authorizes educators to exercise additional supervisory control only in
the context of school-sponsored, curricular activities. 262 By contrast,
student expression that merely happens to occur on campus, but not
within a curricular activity, remains protected from interference of
school authorities by the Tinker standard and should be considered
autonomous student expression.m Similarly, decisions of student edi-
tors that occur in a privately-subsidized, underground newspaper that
does not bear the school's imprimatur could not be attributable to the
state.264
As indicated by the Supreme Court in Rendell-Baker, the receipt of
government funding alone cannot give rise to a finding of state ac-
tion. 2'3' When the funding, however, is combined with coercive power
or significant encouragement, state action may be implied. 266 A survey
259 See supra text accompanying notes 203-13.
266 See supra text accompanying notes 203-13.
261 See Plaintiffs/Appellant's En Banc Appeals Court Brief at 8, Yea (No. 96-1623) [herein-
after "En Banc Brief of Plaintiff'].
262 See supra text accompanying notes 101-15.
26! Seel Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline of Student Press Rights
in the Wake of I lanlwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 Dula L.J. 706, 726.
264 See id.
265 See 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982).
266 See Blum v. Yarctsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
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of the relevant factors in the Yeo case leads ineluctably to the conclu-
sion that a sufficient nexus existed between student editors and state
agents to attribute the students' decision to the state. 267 For instance,
students performed their duties for the periodical on school grounds
and during school hours. 268 Further, the publication identifies itself as
the newspaper of the public high school in its interactions and com-
munications with the students and community. 269
As stated by the en banc court, the factors listed above present "a
close question" whether the students' actions could be fairly attributed
to the state.'" The decisive factor for the en banc court was the "con-
text" of the students' relationship with faculty and administration in
which these factors were situated.'" That decision characterized the
students' relations with school officials as "close to adversarial," and
the court concluded on this basis that it could only characterize the
students' decision as independent of, and therefore not fairly attribut-
able to, the state. 272 As discussed above, the finding of an adversarial
relationship is specious and thus immaterial to the nexus analysis. 2"
Indeed, it can hardly be said that students in a school-sponsored
activity maintain the same adversarial relationship with their teachers
as do public defenders with the state government. 274 Moreover, if a
school publication was truly independent and maintained an adversar-
ial relation to school officials, then it could not serve the pedagogical
interests of the school vis-a-vis the students and community. 2"
Instead, these factors ought to be considered within the context
of the values inculcation pedagogy and its enhanced view of teachers'
roles in school-sponsored activities. 276 Under the values inculcation
regime ushered in by Hazelwood, the influence of faculty advisors in
producing student periodicals assumes a very different posture than
the one described by the en banc court.2" In this framework, school
officials wield the authority to alter school-sponsored publications that
do not meet its standards because these publications are "ungrammati-
cal, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced,
267 See En Banc Brief of Plaintiff at 8.
268 See Yea, 131 F.3d at 254.
"9 See id.
279 See id.
271 See id.
272 See id.
273 See supra notes 254, 255 and accompanying text.
274
 See En Banc Brief of Plaintiff at 11.
279
 See id.
276 See supra text accompanying notes 205-13.
277 See 484 U.S. at 272.
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vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences." 278 After this
decision, therefore, faculty advising always contains the potential for
ultimate censorship. In this context, the suggestive language of faculty
advisors assumes significant influence over the final decisions of stu ,
dent editors. Even where school agents could have acted to alter the
final product but did not, their complicity in the final product cannot
be ignored: faculty members almost always maintain the power to alter
the final product. In other words, school officials' power to control the
content of school publications carries with it the responsibility for the
end product.
2. Symbiotic Relationship Between the School and the Publication
Under Burton, a symbiotic relationship between LI-IS and its
official publications—the yearbook and Musket—gives rise to a finding
of state action if the school and its publications mutually benefit one
another. 279 That these publications prosper from their affiliation with
LI-IS is clear; indeed, they would cease to exist but for the resources
and support provided by LHS officials, LFIS, moreover, receives tangi-
ble benefits from its association with the yearbook and Musket. . LI-IS,
which has its name on the masthead of the Musket, benefits generally
from the positive publicity generated by a school newspaper that has
won awards for journalistic excellence."" The Musket also serves as a
channel of communication for the faculty and administration with
members of the LHS community regarding events, activities and aca-
demic pursuits of the student body. 28 ' In addition, it informs readers
about the diverse pursuits of faculty and adrninistrators. 282
Moreover, LI-IS officials benefit from its association with both
publications because they serve as vehicles which further the school's
educational mission. By allowing students to write and produce school
publications, LI-IS imparts lessons to journalism students regarding
journalistic standards, ethics and management."' In addition, the pub-
lications may provide a means for the school to teach its student
readers about grammar and writing style."' Hazelwood explicitly gives
school officials the authority to police school-sponsored publications
278
 See id. at 271,
278 See supra text accompanying notes 33-40.
288 See En Banc Brief of Plaintiff at 11.
281 See id.
282 See id.
288 See Buss, supra note 231, at 519.
284 See id.
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for speech that is ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately re-
searched, vulgar and prejudiced, and to refuse to publish such material
under its auspices. 285 Schools that take advantage of this authority use
its publications like a grammar textbook, teaching student readers by
example about the elements of writing, editing and journalistic style. 286
Finally, Fraser permits schools to refuse to sponsor student speech
which promotes values or conduct that is inconsistent with the shared
values of a civilized social order. 287 Thus, schobls may also use student:
edited publications to introduce its student readers to cultural values
and to help them contribute to their environment.'" In other words,
under the values inculcation pedagogy endorsed by the Supreme
Court, LHS retains authority over the content of school-sponsored
student speech to impart significant educational lessons regarding
values, just as it uses a traditional classroom exercise or textbook to
teach lessons in science and history. Moreover, the relationship be-
tween LHS and its student publications confers upon each a variety of
incidental benefits. 289 Under Burton, therefore, the student editors'
decision cannot be construed as purely private because LHS has so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the Musket
and yearbook that the state must be recognized as a joint participant
in the challenged activity. 29°
B. Public Forum Analysis
Because the Yea court sitting en Banc did not find state action, it
settled the dispute before reaching the question of whether the LHS
student publications qualified as public fora. 29 ' Where the court finds
state action, by contrast, it must determine whether the student publi-
cations constitute public fora to ascertain whether plaintiff Yco has a
constitutional right to advertise in the Musket and yearbook. The panel
decision determined that both LHS publications were limited public
fora and therefore decided that the exclusion of LEXNET's advertise-
ments violated Yco's freedom of expression. 292 This decision was incor-
rect. The court should have found that the advertising spaces of the
285 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
286 See Buss, supra note 231, at 519.
287 See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
288 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272.
289 See En Banc Brief of Plaintiff at 11.
No See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
291 See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 Va. 292173, at *16, *30 (1st Cir. 1997).
2'i2
 See Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *16.
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LI-IS publications were non-public fora, based upon the policy and
practice of the editorial board regarding the acceptance and publica-
tion of advertisements. As non-public fora, LI-IS educators and student
editors could lawfully refuse to open its pages to advertisers.
The Supreme Court's public forum analysis requires that the LI-IS
publications be classified as one of the three categories identified in
Perry: non-public fora, limited public fora or traditional public fora."
Under Perry, government bodies create designated public fora when
they open its property for indiscriminate use by the public; the govern-
ment engenders limited public fora by limiting its property's use to
certain classes of speakers."' A public forum is not created unless the
state actor evinces, by policy or by practice, a specific intention to open
its pages to use by the public for the purposes of speech. 295 Thus, the
central issue under the public forum analysis in determining whether,
and which, forum has been created is the intention of the student
editors, as stated in advertisement policies or as manifested in their
practice of accepting advertisements. 296
In this cast, the LHS Musket and yearbook did not maintain
advertising policies which demonstrated the requisite intent to open
their advertising pages to the general public to qualify as limited or
designated public fora. 297 Both periodicals maintained unwritten poli-
cies against the acceptance of political advertisements.298 Moreover,
after the litigation began in 1994, both publications reduced their
policies to writing. 299
The record is also clear that the school did not evince, through
its advertising practices, an intention to provide a general advertising
space to the public!'" Although it. is true that some advertising was
accepted, no evidence exists that either of the publications ever ac-
cepted the type of political or advocacy advertisements submitted by
Yeo."' Student editors only published advertisements that catered to
293 See supra notes 61-82 and accompanying text.
71'`I See supra notes 61-82 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 61-82 and accompanying text.
296 See supra notes 61-82 and accompanying text.
297 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267.
299 See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 243-44. Although the policies against accepting political and advocacy
advertising were unwritten, the maintenance of even an unwritten policy is sufficient to demon-
strate an intention not to turn their publications' advertising pages into a public forum. See Perry
Educ. Ass'it v, Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,47 n.7 (1983).
299 See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 248.
399 See A micas Curiae Brief on Rehearing En Banc in Support of Defendants/Appellees at 13,
Yea (No. 96-1623) I hereinafter "Amicusl3ricri,
501 See id. at 13; see also Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (public transit system
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student tastes, including video, book and record stores, as well as test
preparation services and a deli. 302 Moreover, the publications uniformly
enforced their policies against acceptance of political advertisements
on all viewpoints, including an advertisement promoting the opposite
viewpoint from Yeo's. 3°3
Policy considerations also support a finding that the advertising
pages of student publications do not constitute public fora. Indeed,
such a finding is also consistent with the values inculcation pedagogical
model now predominant in the Supreme Court. If a court requires
school-sponsored student publications that publish advertisements to
publish all submitted political advertisements, school officials will be
left with only two options. One option would be to terminate the
advertising sections, forego the money raised through this section and
prevent some journalism students from learning the role of business
manager, which is a key part of any commercial publication.
School officials' second option would be to broadcast the opinions
of outsiders in school-sponsored publications, regardless of the adver-
tisements' age-appropriateness or particular message. One wonders
whether advertisements extolling the virtues of Naziism or chemical
warfare would be afforded similar protection and win the right of
access in high school publications over the objections of editors and
school officials. 304 Although newspaper editors and school officials may
not agree with the opinions published in its advertising pages, this fact
may not appear clear to readers. Publication of a disclaimer may
remedy this confusion, but it may not be sufficient to overcome the
presumption that opinions published in publications bearing the im-
primatur of the school represent the opinions of its editors or publish-
er." This confusion certainly poses the potential for embarrassing
those responsible for publication of political views with which they do
not agree. More significantly, however, school officials and older stu-
dents (such as newspaper editors) act as role models, demonstrating
the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their
conduct and deportment in and out of class. 306 These role models,
acting in loco parenlis, could not fulfill their roles if required to sponsor
displayed advertising but could constitutionally refuse to display all political and public issue
advertising).
s°2 See Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *31.
"See Amieus Brief at 13.
3 CH See Coyle, supra note 61, at 784.
305
 See id.
501, See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
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speech they would deem inappropriate for their charges or younger
colleagues. 8"7
CONCLUSION
The First Circuit sitting en banc correctly deCided the Yea case by
finding that student editors who refused to publish a political or
advocacy advertisement did not violate petitioner Yco's First Amend-
ment rights. 3°8 However, the court's finding that the student's refusal
to publish did not constitute state action is flawed." The court rea-
soned that the state did not play any meaningful role in the students'
refusal to publish the advertisement. 31 " However, the court did not
address the values inculcation pedagogical theory currently prevailing
in Supreme Court jurisprudence that endows school officials with
significant control over the speech content of school-sponsored activi-
ties:311
This heightened level of control, which school officials may use to
associate the school only with values that the school finds appropriate
to teach, leads to two conclusions that implicate the state in decisions
made by student editors." First, if school officials have permitted
speech to be published under its auspices, it may be presumed that
they have scrutinized its content and approved its publication for
(1) age appropriateness, or (2) its advocacy of activity such as drug
use, irresponsible sex and conduct otherwise inconsistent with its edu-
cational triission. 91 ' Second, the school and its student-edited publica-
tions maintain a mutually beneficial relationship that resembles a joint
venture and therefore precludes a finding that the student actions arc
purely private. 5"
Upon finding state action in the students' decision, the court
should have found that the student newspaper does not qualify as a
public fortim.s 15 Applying the Hazelwood standard, which holds that a
limited public forum is created only when the government specifically
intends to do so, is consistent with the values inculcation pedagogy,
3° See id. at 684,
888 See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241,255 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 2060
(1998).
3 °9 See id.
51 ° See id.
311 See supra text accompanying notes 203-13.
912 See supra text accompanying notes 252-90.
313 See 1 Jar clwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,272 (1988).
314 See supra text accompanying notes 279-90.
315 See supra text accompanying notes 291-307.
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which gives educators strict control over the content of school-spon-
sored publications.''' A contrary result, which would permit an out-
sider to publish a political advertisement in a student newspaper over
the objections of its editors, is certainly not consistent with a theory
that encourages educators' heightened control over school aetivities. 317
BENJAMIN WATTENMAKER
31 °See supra text accompanying notes 291-307.
917 See supra text accompanying notes 291-307.
